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Abstract
Most research on public opinion assumes that American political views are
structured by a belief system with a clearly-defined liberal-conservative polar-
ity; however, this is not true of all Americans. In this article we document
systematic heterogeneity in the organization of political attitudes and explain
its basis in the sociodemographic profile of the respondents. We use Relational
Class Analysis (RCA), a network-based method for detecting heterogeneity in
collective patterns of opinion, to identify distinctive belief networks, each shared
by a different group of respondents. Analyzing ANES data between 1984 and
2004, we identify three groups of American citizens: Ideologues, whose political
attitudes strongly align with either liberal or conservative categories; Alterna-
tives, who are instead morally conservative but economically liberal, or vice
versa; and Agnostics, who exhibit weak associations among political beliefs.
Respondents’ sociodemographic profiles, particularly their income, education,
and religiosity, lie at the core of the different ways in which they understand
politics.
∗Please do not quote without permission. We thank Paul DiMaggio, Andrew Gelman, and Emily
Marshall for useful comments. The usual disclaimer does apply. Direct all correspondence to Delia
Baldassarri, 147 Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. (dbalda@princeton.edu).
†Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Princeton University.
‡Ph.D candidate, Department of Sociology, Princeton University.
Studies in public opinion traditionally assume the existence of a single belief sys-
tem by which interconnected political beliefs are organized: in the U.S., such a polit-
ical belief system is assumed to be structured by a clearly-defined polarity between
conservative and liberal views. Converse’s seminal research on this topic (1964), as
well as the work of numerous scholars following him, demonstrates that only a small
proportion of the public can appreciate the political debate using abstract categories
such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, while the large majority of citizens exhibit limited
levels of constraint and coherence in the overall organization of their political beliefs.
According to this framework, citizens greatly differ in their levels of political sophis-
tication, thus in their capacity to understand politics using established ideological
categories. Most citizens are, in fact, “innocent of ideology” (Converse 1964; see also
Campell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Luskin 1987).
The validity of these findings has not been challenged on empirical grounds – re-
sults are in fact very robust and stable over time and across cultures (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1991; Popkin 1991; Popkin and Dimoch 1999, but see Ansolabehere, Rod-
den, and Snyder (2006) for a different view). Over the last two decades, however,
scholars have begun to question the assumption of homogeneity that underlies these
analyses (namely, the presupposition that there exists a single way of making sense
of the political debate) in favor of the possibility that “people make up their minds
in different ways” (Sniderman et al. 1991, 8). This work starts from the premise
that individuals differ qualitatively in the ways they think about politics, and rely
on different schemata or cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) to make decisions about po-
litical matters (Kinder and Sears 1985; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock
1991; Zaller 1992; Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000; Kuklinski 2001; Baldassarri
2005). Research in political cognition has relaxed the assumption of homogeneity
by focusing on different schemata (Lodge, McGrawn, Conover, Feldman, and Miller
1991) or levels of political expertise (Fiske and Kinder 1981; Krosnick 1990), modal-
ities of information processing (Lodge and McGraw 1995; Campus 2000), and the
use of heuristics (Fiorina 1981; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991;
Lupia 1994; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000): some studies also focus on affective ele-
ments as complements to cognitive components of political decision-making (i.e., the
“likeability heuristic” proposed by Sniderman et al. 1991).
In this article, we move the research on political heterogeneity a step forward in
two major respects. First, we demonstrate the coexistence of multiple belief sys-
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tems. Rather than assuming that the political debate can be interpreted exclusively
in terms of the liberal-conservative divide, we explore the possibility that individuals
differ qualitatively in the ways in which they structure their political preferences, and
document the coexistence of alternative belief systems in the American population.
Second, we show that people’s social identities are implicated in generating these
alternative belief systems. Namely, different sociodemographic profiles (combinations
of relevant sociodemographic characteristics) are correlated with distinct ways of un-
derstanding politics. The relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and
political beliefs is not always straightforward. When devising their political alle-
giances, citizens are often required to balance complex, and sometimes contradictory,
interests and identities (see Fischer and Hout 2006 for a rare attempt to map political
attitudes sociodemographically). This has presumably become an even more challeng-
ing task in recent decades with the growing salience of ‘cultural values’ in American
political discourse. Within the dominant political framework, how can a low-income,
highly religious African-American voter, for example, reconcile liberal tendencies on
economic redistribution and civil rights with moral conservatism? We argue that peo-
ple whose social identities are incompatible with the prescriptive liberal-conservative
polarity gravitate toward alternative ways of conceptualizing the political debate to
accommodate their seemingly “contradictory” political preferences. At the same time
these alternative political logics are systematic: our goal is not to capture individual
idiosyncrasies. Rather, we identify political Weltanschauungs that are shared within
different social groups and shaped by the political offer and macro-institutional ar-
rangements (Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000; Kuklinski 2001; Baldassarri and
Schadee 2006).
In order to detect heterogeneity in collective patterns of opinions, we apply a
network-based method, Relational Class Analysis (RCA, Goldberg 2011), to Ameri-
cans’ political attitudes, analyzing data from the American National Election Studies
over a period of twenty years (1984 to 2004). First, we construct an attitudinal prox-
imity matrix for all respondents that captures the extent to which they exhibit similar
patterns of association between political preferences. Second, we partition the matrix
into groups that exhibit distinctive belief networks (patterns of relationships between
beliefs), each group subscribing to a distinctive political logic according to which
certain opinions are correlated with one another.1 Unlike previous research, this ap-
1We use network analytical techniques to identify relationships among beliefs, as opposed to
3
proach does not require any presuppositions about how political beliefs are organized,
or how sociodemographic attributes (e.g., education) or cognitive capabilities (e.g.,
political knowledge) structure political opinion.
Our method produces robust findings which are consistent over this twenty-year
period. In each year analyzed, we find three groups of respondents: Ideologues, who
organize their political attitudes according to the prevalent liberal-conservative polar-
ity; Alternatives, who exhibit a dissociation between moral and economic attitudes –
they may be morally conservative and economically liberal, or vice versa (e.g., they are
pro-abortion but oppose economic redistribution); and Agnostics, who exhibit only
weak associations among political beliefs (Analysis I). We then establish the consis-
tency of this partition over time, its capacity to distinguish respondents according to
their level of political sophistication, and its relevance for the contemporary debate
on partisanship and issue alignment (Analysis II).
Our contribution extends beyond a simple descriptive account of how people’s po-
litical preferences are cognitively organized. We add to understanding of the intricate
relationships among sociodemographic characteristics, political beliefs, and partisan-
ship in several ways. First, we show that the relationship between sociodemographic
characteristics (education, income and religiosity) and individual preferences on po-
litical issues is contingent on the belief system to which individuals subscribe. For
instance, high-income individuals tend to be morally conservative in the Ideologue
group, while they are morally liberal in the Alternative group. Second, we find that
Alternatives’ heterodox pattern of views, in which opinions that are normally consid-
ered conservative combine with those considered liberal, is the by-product of tension
between conflicting identities and political interests. The Alternative group is dis-
proportionately composed of high earners with weak religious commitments, and low
income individuals who are very religious. These ‘rich but secular’ or ‘poor but re-
ligious’ citizens are motivated by combinations of interests that make it particularly
difficult to be consistently conservative (or liberal) on both moral and economic is-
sues. Indeed, they deviate from the orthodox understanding of politics, adopting an
Alternative view in which conservatism and liberalism are not entirely at odds. Fi-
nally, we find that individuals holding seemingly competing opinion are more likely
to be influenced by their conservative tendencies: the co-presence of conservative and
liberal preferences is, more often than not, resolved in favor of the Republican Party
people, for which network analysis is conventionally used (DiMaggio 2010).
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(Analysis III).
These results raise important methodological questions concerning the limitations
of traditional analytical techniques, which assume population homogeneity in the
organization of political beliefs. Failing to recognize the heterogeneity of political
belief systems may lead to biased evaluations of the impact of sociodemographic
factors and political preferences on political behavior.
Conceptualizing and Measuring Multiple Belief
Systems
Converse defines a belief system as a “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which
the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interde-
pendence” (Converse 1964, 207). One way of conceptualizing constraint is to imagine
a multidimensional ‘belief space’ in which each dimension measures opinion on one
political issue. Individuals’ positions in this space correspond to their political prefer-
ences. Constraint refers to the extent to which positions on various issues are bound
together, thus leaving certain areas of the space largely unoccupied (Martin 2002).
A belief system does not prescribe the adoption of certain opinions; rather it defines
which opinions go with one another. People may frame their understanding of politics
in similar terms, even if they take different substantive positions. Conservative and
liberal pundits such as Rush Limbaugh or John Stewart, for example, subscribe to
very similar logics of conceptualizing the political debate in the U.S., despite their
vehement disagreements. To have a shared understanding does not imply having
identical attitudes or behaviors, but rather being in agreement on the structures of
relevance and opposition that make actions and symbols meaningful. Empirically,
this means focusing on the relationships between political preferences, thus on po-
litical belief networks, rather than examining preferences discretely (Goldberg 2011;
DiMaggio 1997; 2010).
In the U.S., political discourse is commonly assumed to be constrained by single
belief system that is structured along a liberal-conservative continuum. Despite the
fact that most Americans exhibit limited levels of constraint in their political opinions
(DiMaggio et al. 1996; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), established public discourse
has little room for configurations of opinion that depart from the liberal-conservative
rationale, and scholars tend to consider those who diverge from the mainstream less
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sophisticated in their ability to reason politically (Converse 1964). Yet it is important
to make an analytical distinction between divergences that are the result of weak opin-
ion constraint and those that present an alternative, but internally coherent, belief
system. Consider a group of hypothetical respondents asked about their opinions on
three issues: affirmative action, gay rights and health care reform. We would expect
those subscribing to a liberal ideology to express positive attitudes on all three issues,
and those defining themselves as conservative to express negative attitudes. Figure
1 plots these respondents on a stylized belief space. Respondents plotted in red, and
marked with a plus sign, seem to follow the conventional liberal-conservative logic:
they either support or oppose (to varying degrees) all three issues (i.e., subject D).
Those plotted in blue, and marked by a dot (i.e., subjects A, B, and C), deviate from
this pattern: their position on gay rights is opposed to their positions on the two other
issues. Examined individually, these deviations might seem like misunderstandings of
what the political debate is about. Yet taken together, these supposedly unsophisti-
cated individuals exhibit a coherent pattern of political attitudes; their organization
of preferences constitutes an alternative to the dominant belief system.
Figure 1 about here.
Our expectation is that not all respondents who depart from the liberal-
conservative belief system are misinformed about politics. Rather, we argue that
when such heterogeneity is systematic – when it is consistent within groups of re-
spondents – it can be understood as evidence of multiple belief systems. To explore
this possibility, we use Relational Class Analysis (RCA, Goldberg 2011). RCA divides
a sample of respondents into groups that exhibit distinctive belief networks. Members
of the same group do not necessarily hold the same opinions, however. For example,
respondents A and B in Figure 1 express opposing opinions on all three issues. Nev-
ertheless, they both exhibit the same pattern of interdependences between opinions,
suggesting that they organize their beliefs using the same rationale, even if deployed
in opposite directions. RCA, by examining patterns of responses in the aggregate,
distinguishes between different groups of respondents that exhibit distinctive patterns
of opinions, such as the two groups depicted in Figure 1.
In technical terms, RCA constructs a proximity matrix between all pairs of respon-
dents. The value of each cell in the matrix corresponds to the degree of relationality
between the given pair of respondents. Relationality captures similarity in the or-
ganization of political preferences by measuring the aggregate difference between all
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pairs of the two respondents’ individual opinions. Formally, relationality Rij between
observations i and j in dataset X of N observations and K variables is defined as
follows:
Rij =
2
K(K − 1)
K−1∑
k=l
K∑
l=k+1
(λklij ∗ σklij ) (1)
where:
σklij = 1−
∣∣∣|∆Xkli | − |∆Xklj |∣∣∣ (2)
is the relational similarity for the variable pair k, l between observations i and j,
∆Xkli = X
k
i −X li (3)
is the distance between the values of variables k and l for observation i, and
λklij =
{
1 ∆Xkli ∗∆Xklj ≥ 0
−1 ∆Xkli ∗∆Xklj < 0 (4)
is a binary coefficient that determines the sign of the relational similarity: λklij is
positive if ∆Xkl has the same sign for observations i and j, and is negative otherwise.
Like correlation, relationality is bounded by -1 and +1. Values close to either
extreme indicate that the patterns of responses of the two individuals are strongly
similar, either in the same (such as respondents A and C in Figure 1) or opposing
(respondents A and B) directions. Values in between these extremes indicate that the
two respondents (such as A and D) exhibit different patterns, and therefore subscribe
to different belief systems. RCA transforms the matrix by retaining only those cells
that are close to either extreme, and taking their absolute value. The resulting matrix
represents a network in which ties connect individuals who share similar patterns of
beliefs, although not necessarily similar beliefs. RCA then uses a spectral algorithm
in order to partition the network into groups that maximize within-group relationality
(cfr. Goldberg 2011 and SI2 for additional information). Each group thus corresponds
to a different and distinctive belief system.2
2RCA is particularly designed to detect heterogeneity in response patterns in ordinal attitudinal
data. Though similar to correlation, relationality outperforms correlation for this purpose because it
is less sensitive to outliers and therefore does not over-weight responses by opinionated respondents.
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To conclude, we argue that accounting for heterogeneity in the organization of
political beliefs requires addressing three methodological limitations endemic to ana-
lytical strategies commonly used in studies of public opinion and political cognition.
First, as the underlying logic of a political belief system inheres in the relationships
between political opinions, beliefs must be examined in relation to one another, not
independently. Second, because these relationships vary across groups of individuals,
we must avoid a priori assumptions about how people organize their political belief sys-
tems. Otherwise, we risk privileging dominant understandings of the political debate
and neglecting others. Finally, the relationship between sociodemographic variables
and political attitudes can vary across political belief systems. Decomposing the pop-
ulation into predetermined sociodemographically homogenous groups may actually
mask the predictive effects of these variables.
Our analytical strategy is particularly suited for detecting individual heterogeneity
in the composition of political beliefs while overcoming these limitations. It both in-
ductively identifies the organization of coexisting political belief systems, and assigns
respondents to the resulting groups, without relying on assumptions about how issues
or individuals are interrelated. Other existing methods that explore underlying latent
variables, such as factor analysis or latent class analysis, either look at the respon-
dents in the aggregate to group variables together (as is the case with factor analysis),
or look for groups of individuals who provided substantively similar responses, while
overlooking the relationships between these responses. Neither technique examines
intra-variable and intra-respondent variability simultaneously as RCA does.
Analysis
We apply RCA to data from the American National Election Studies and replicate
the analysis for all years available for the period 1984-2004.3 ANES includes a large
number of attitudinal questions on political issues, ranging from state economic inter-
vention and spending to civil rights, morality, and foreign policy.4 We classified atti-
tudinal questions into four different issue domains: Economic; Civil Rights; Morality;
3Unfortunately, substantial changes in the survey instrument made it impossible to replicate
the analysis for 2008. Moreover, years 1990, 1998, and 2002 had too many missing answers to be
included. See supporting materials for a detailed description of the data included in the analysis.
4We considered all the attitude questions that were asked at least three times and received
a sufficient number of responses (cfr. Baldassarri and Gelman 2008 for a discussion of temporal
comparability problems).
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and Security/Foreign Policy. Examples of Economic issues are government involve-
ment in the provision of health insurance and jobs, and federal spending on the poor,
welfare, and food stamps. Civil Rights issues concern the treatment of African Amer-
icans and other minorities, as well as opinions on affirmative action and equality of
opportunities and chances. Moral issues include abortion, gay rights, women’s role
in society, traditional values, and new lifestyles. Finally, Security and Foreign Policy
issues (hereafter referred to as Foreign Policy issues) comprise, among others, interna-
tional cooperation, federal spending on defense, the space program and international
aid. For a detailed account of all the variables used in the analysis see supporting
information SI1.
The analysis proceeds as follows: First, we present RCA results for the year 2004
in great detail. We provide a substantive interpretation of the three different political
belief systems identified by examining the belief network within each system. Second,
we present results from all years, showing that the same three underlying belief sys-
tems have consistently structured understandings of the political debate throughout
the twenty-year period from 1984 to 2004. Finally, we explore the sociodemographic
makeup of each group to examine both what attributes make individuals more likely
to subscribe to a particular belief system, and how sociodemographic attributes relate
to political behavior in each of the groups.
Analysis I: Ideologues, Alternatives, and Agnostics
We begin by closely examining responses from 2004. Our application of RCA to the
data resulted in a partition of respondents into three groups of comparable sizes (that
include 33%, 40%, and 27% of the population, respectively). For each group, we rep-
resent the belief network by looking at the correlations between political preferences.
The strength and directionality of the correlation coefficients are visually represented
in Figure 2. In the right column we show this information in matrix form; political
issues are grouped by issue domain. In the left column we use network visualizations
to better reveal the overall structures of the three political belief systems: each node
corresponds to a political attitude (nodes are color-coded by issue domain), and we
draw edges connecting political attitudes when correlation coefficients are statistically
significant (at α = 0.05). Solid lines represent positive correlations, and dashed lines
negative correlations. Line shades and widths are proportional to the strength of the
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correlation.5
Figure 2 about here.
Members of the first group exhibit a densely interconnected belief network. Fol-
lowing Converse, we call them Ideologues. Ideologues organize their political attitudes
according to the liberal-conservative ideological continuum and show very high levels
of constraint among issues across all four issue domains. Conversely, members of the
second group – the Alternatives – do not fully adopt the liberal-conservative frame-
work. Their position on economic (yellow nodes) and civil rights issues (green nodes)
is dissociated from their preferences on moral issues (red nodes). As the negative
correlations suggest, in 2004, Alternatives tend to be morally conservative and so-
cially liberal, or vice versa (i.e., a member of this group who is pro-choice is likely to
oppose economic redistribution and the promotion of civil rights). Finally, members
of the third group exhibit weak associations among political beliefs: their network is
relatively sparse. Unlike in the two other groups, correlations within issue domains in
this group are sporadic and weak; no coherent pattern of belief organization is readily
apparent. It seems that members of this group are, generally, not as politically con-
sistent as their peers are. For lack of a better term, we characterize them as Agnostics
for the remainder of the analysis. Further analyses, which are not reported, provide
suggestive evidence that this group is characterized by a subtle decoupling between
attitudes specifically relating to African-Americans, and those relating to economic
and civic inequality. Members of this group are systematically more conservative than
their peers on issues explicitly pertaining to race. We suspect that these individuals’
thinking about politics is, perhaps unconsciously, shaped by racial intolerance, but
we do not pursue this line of investigation any further in the present paper. The
remainder of this analysis mostly focuses on the other two, more clearly ideologically
structured, groups.
Analysis II: Temporal Stability, Validity, and Change
A political belief system is a fundamental and durable component of the political
landscape, which, barring unusual exceptions, remains stable in the face of cam-
5All the diagrams are standardized such that the widths and shades of all the edges/cells on
the graphs/matrices correspond to the exact same levels. Networks are spatially drawn using the
Furchtman-Reingold algorithm so that distances between nodes correspond to the edge weights
connecting them. Otherwise, the spatial position of each node is insignificant.
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paigns and other political events. While at any given moment in time the political
discourse tends to concentrate on a few salient issues and neglect others, the over-
all organization of beliefs is the “shared grammar” that guarantees continuity over
time. Thus, if our findings describe Americans’ belief systems, as we argue, they
should be temporally consistent. We applied RCA over a period of twenty years and
found staggering similarities in the results. For all years but one, the RCA algorithm
detected three groups, which clearly exhibited Ideologue, Alternative and Agnostic
patterns. RCA produced a partition into four groups only for data from 1996, and
merging the additional group with one of the three other groups only insignificantly
decreased within-group relationality. This allowed us to maintain a tripartite division
throughout the twenty-year period. For a more detailed description of how the RCA
procedure was implemented, consult supporting information SI2.
The belief structure of each of the three groups remained surprisingly stable over
time. Since different questions were asked in different survey years, we cannot compare
correlations between specific pairs of questions over time. Nevertheless, we are able to
examine the overall correlation structure between the four issue domains. These are
reported in Figure 3. Each of the matrices in this figure summarizes the correlations
between pairs of issue domains in one survey year, for one of the three groups. Each
matrix cell represents the average weighted correlation between all pairs of variables
in the two issue domains the cell corresponds to (see SI4 for more details). For
instance, the top cell in each matrix reports the intensity and sign of the average
weighted correlation between economic and civil rights issues: in the Ideologue group
in 2004, the average correlation between pairs of economic and civil rights variables
was 0.43. Over the entire period, the Ideologue group is characterized by extremely
high correlation coefficients for all issue domain pairs.
The Alternative group presents a substantial dissociation between economic and
civil rights issues, on the one hand, and moral issues, on the other. With the exception
of the period 1992-1996, in all years the relationship between moral and economic
or civil rights issues is insignificant or even negative, as shown previously for 2004.
Further visual inspections of the belief networks, as well as a factorial analysis, confirm
the tendency among Alternatives to decouple their preferences on moral issues from
their opinion on other issues. Throughout the period under study, and particularly in
1994 and 1996, opinions on moral issues are far apart from those on economic and civil
rights issues, even when correlations between them are significantly positive. (Belief
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networks graphs are available from the authors, while results from factor analysis are
reported in SI3). Finally, in all years, the Agnostic group is a pale version of the
Ideologue groups showing comparatively weak positive, or insignificant, correlations
between issue domains.
Figure 3 about here.
A deeper examination of group members’ political sophistication provides addi-
tional support for the validity of our partition. Converse’s study and later work in
this tradition have repeatedly demonstrated that the consistency and constraint of
political beliefs are related to one’s level of political sophistication: individuals with
high levels of education, interest in politics, and political knowledge show, on average,
greater levels of political coherence. Scholars who follow the cognitive heuristics ap-
proach use this as a starting point for analyses that classify individuals by their levels
of education or political knowledge. In line with both of these scholarly traditions, we
find that our partition effectively captures inter-group differences in levels of political
sophistication.
Figure 4 about here.
The plots in Figure 4 report group means for four variables that are commonly
used as measures of political sophistication: education, political interest, political ac-
tivism, and political discussion. Circles indicate that the group mean is significantly
different from the mean of those not in the group. For all four measures, Ideologues
and Agnostics are at opposite ends of the sophistication spectrum: Ideologues consis-
tently have higher levels of education, political interest, activism and discussion than
Agnostics, and Alternatives occupy a position in between these two extremes. This
result is consistent over time. Unlike previous studies that presuppose that political
sophistication relates to belief constraint, our partitioning strategy makes no such
a priori assumption, thus providing a test of this relationship. While other schol-
ars assume differences based on political sophistication, we provide a proof for this
assumption.
Finally, we relate our results to changes in American public opinion since the
1970s. Recent scholarship on political partisanship and public opinion polarization
has documented an increase in political partisanship (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Levendusky 2009) along
with the growing relevance of moral issues (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002;
Carmines and Wagner 2006, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).
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Nonetheless there is no evidence of greater constraint between moral issues and other
issue domains in the population as a whole. A process of alignment on moral issues
is visible only among individuals with high levels of income, and those who are more
educated, politically active, and interested in politics (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008;
see also Layman and Carsey 2002). The RCA partition captures this process, and
contributes to its explanation. We find that the alignment along moral issues has
occurred exclusively within the Ideologue group, and that, over the last ten years
in particular, Alternatives have experienced a process of decoupling between moral
issues on the one hand, and economic and civil rights issues on the other. This finding
further explains why studies of public opinion have found little evidence of alignment
on moral issues, even as political discourse has become increasingly polarized on
themes such abortion and gay rights.
Figure 5 about here.
Figure 5 displays the same results reported in Figure 3, highlighting change over
time. Each plot reports the average correlation between all pairs of issues in two given
domains over the twenty-year period. In the Ideologue group, the average correlation
between civil rights and moral issues more than doubled in two decades from less than
0.2 in 1984 to more than 0.4 in 2004. A similar trend is visible for the relationship
between economic and moral issues. In the Alternative group, however, the average
correlation between these issues remained null during nearly all of this time period.
Moreover, by 2004 moral issues became significantly negatively correlated with both
other issue domains in this group, so that those expressing conservative opinions on
economic or civil rights issues tended to express liberal opinions on moral issues,
and vice versa. In sum, the increasing salience of moral issues seems to reflect an
intensifying ideological bifurcation whereby Ideologues increasingly integrate moral
issues into their liberal-conservative framework, whereas Alternatives’ lack of a struc-
tured relationship between moral and other political views evolves into a relationship
opposite to that described in the dominant political discourse.
Analysis III: The Sociodemographics of Belief Spaces
Can socio-demographics account for heterogeneity in the ways people organize their
thinking about politics? Scholars have long examined how different social attributes
such as class, religion and racial identity are related to political preferences and be-
haviors. Yet they have mostly limited their analyses to relationships between single
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preferences and sociodemographic characteristics, without considering relationships
among beliefs. Though informative, this strategy may be misleading: if different
people organize their political beliefs in different ways, the relationship between so-
ciodemographic variables and political beliefs might vary across cognitive frameworks.
Consider again the two hypothetical groups depicted in Figure 1: something about
who these people are might make them think about politics in systematically different
ways. Suppose subject B is a working-class, Kansan male of the kind Frank (2004)
writes about. His modest means might make him likely to support health care reform,
while his small-town roots might steer him toward moral conservatism. His mirror
image, subject A, might be a high-earning urban cosmopolitan who holds progressive
opinions about gay rights, but who nevertheless vehemently opposes health reform
and its potential detrimental effects on his income. For members of this group like
A and B, we might expect income to be positively associated with moral liberalism.
In another group, however, where subject D’s support for health reform is associated
with moral and racial liberalism, we might expect income to be negatively related
with moral liberalism. In other words, within each ideational group, social attributes
might have different relationships with particular opinions. This is precisely what
we demonstrate next by examining the sociodemographic organization of the belief
space.
Figure 6 about here.
Figure 6 visualizes the belief space along its economic and moral dimensions.6
Each panel examines how one sociodemographic attribute relates to positions in this
two-dimensional space, in which each of the three RCA groups is represented by a
line. The coordinates that mark the two extremes of each line correspond to the
mean correlation between the sociodemographic attribute in question and the vari-
ables that make up the relevant opinion category (economic or moral), averaged over
the twenty-year period under study. The plus and minus signs represent high and
low sociodemographic values, respectively. The lines connecting these coordinates
thus illustrate the direction and magnitude of the relationship between the sociode-
mographic variable and opinions on economic and moral issues. For example, the
upper left diagram plots the location in belief space of the highest and lowest income
categories in each of the RCA groups. In the Ideologue group, high income is, on av-
6Similar results are obtained considering civil rights instead of the economic dimension; the two
dimensions can be considered interchangeable for this part of the analysis.
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erage, positively correlated both with economic and moral conservatism, as indicated
by the blue line. In the Alternative group, high income is also positively correlated
with economic conservatism, but is negatively correlated with moral conservatism. In
the Agnostic group, high income is correlated only with economic conservatism, while
there is no relationship with opinions on morality. High earners tend to be economi-
cally conservative in all groups, but they have opposing views on moral issues: while
high-income Ideologues are also morally conservative, their Alternative peers tend to
be morally liberal.
The diagrams also illustrate that the more professional and more educated tend
to be morally liberal in both the Ideologue and Alternative groups. However, it is
only amongst the Alternatives that these two attributes are also strongly associated
with economic conservatism. Similarly, religious participation and age are strongly
associated with moral conservatism in both groups, but only in the Ideologue group
are they associated with economic conservatism. (As one would expect, religiosity
has a strong correlation with moral conservatism in all three groups.) Surprisingly,
however, living in the south accounts for almost no variability in opinions on either
dimension in either group. Finally, African-Americans tend to be economically liberal
in both the Ideologue and Alternative groups. While they tend to be slightly morally
liberal in the Ideologue group, they lean toward moral conservatism in the Alternative
group.
On the whole, the above sociodemographic decomposition of the belief space sug-
gests that the relationship between social positions and political beliefs is contingent
on the overall organization of beliefs. In particular, class (as measured by income) and
religious participation play different roles in the Ideologue and Alternative groups:
whereas in the former both are associated with moral and economic conservatism,
in the latter their associations are oppositional. High-income individuals who sub-
scribe to the Alternative belief system are, like their Ideological peers, economically
conservative, but unlike them are morally liberal; similarly, religious Alternatives
are morally conservative like their Ideologue peers, but differ by being economically
moderate, on average.
Figure 7 about here.
These results suggest that the interplay between income and religiosity has a bear-
ing on how people understand politics. To investigate this possibility, we modeled
the odds ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group (versus being assigned to
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the Alternative group) as a function of an interaction between income and religious
participation. Figure 7 plots the odds from a multinomial logistic regression (cfr.
caption for further details) demonstrating that high-income individuals who often
attend religious services are more than twice as likely to be Ideologues as their low-
income counterparts. High-income individuals who never attend religious services,
on the other hand, are 10% less likely to be Ideologues than their low income coun-
terparts. The slope of the line changes from positive to negative as a function of
religious attendance. In other words, high-income and religious or working-class and
non-religious individuals are more likely to align with the liberal-conservative ideol-
ogy. In contrast, non-religious high-earners and religious low-earners orient toward
the Alternative group. Our interpretation of these results is that the latter two groups
occupy social positions that push them to take ideological stances that are seemingly
contradictory. To reconcile this tension they deviate from the orthodox view (the
liberal-conservative framework) to adopt an alternative way of understanding poli-
tics.
Figure 8 about here.
The organization of political belief systems is thus related in a non-trivial way
to individuals’ sociodemographic profiles. This raises the question of how citizens
define their partisan allegiances in the presence of competing interests and political
views. The political debate, at least as represented in the media, is primarily orga-
nized around a liberal-conservative framework. How do Alternatives strike a balance
among their political preferences? Do their economic worldviews trump their opin-
ions about morality when ultimately deciding on whom to vote for? We modeled
party self-identification and found that when alternatives’ conservatism on the moral
dimension, and even more significantly on the economic dimension, is strong, they
tend to disregard their other preferences and identify with the Republican Party.
In Figure 8.A we plot Ideologues’ (blue line) and Alternatives’ (red line) party self-
identification as a function of the difference between their degree of conservatism on
economic and moral issues, using OLS regression and controlling for additional rele-
vant sociodemographic characteristics (see caption and SI5 for further details). The
independent variable, the economic-moral delta, corresponds to the difference between
respondents’ mean level of economic conservatism and their mean level of moral con-
servatism. Alternative respondents who are strongly economically conservative but
morally moderate or liberal, as well as those who are strongly morally conservative
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but economically moderate or liberal, are significantly more likely to identify as Re-
publicans than to those whose moral and economic opinions are congruent. When
faced with seemingly competing opinions, Alternatives are more likely to be influ-
enced by their conservative opinions, and identify with the Republican Party. This is
not the case in the Ideologue group, however, where the economic-moral delta is in-
significantly consequential for party self-identification, and where, conversely, opinion
incongruence is related to less support for the Republican Party. In other words, the
different relationships between particular political attitudes and party identification
that are found in different groups suggest that the effect of political preferences on
voting behavior is mediated by the overall organization of beliefs.
The same can be said for the relationship between sociodemographic character-
istics and partisanship. While for Ideologues, self-identification has a curvilinear
relationship with education, with both low and high education leading to identifi-
cation with the Democratic Party, in the Alternative group, identification with the
Democratic Party strongly decreases as a function of education (Figure 8.B). Educa-
tion predicts different voting behaviors depending on individuals’ ideological frame-
work: educated Ideologues tend to vote Democratic, but in the Alternative group,
the educated lean toward economical conservatism, and are ultimately drawn to the
Republican Party. Unlike education, as income and religious participation increase,
the likelihood of self-identifying as Republican increases in both groups (Figures 8.C
and 8.D).
Figure 9 about here.
Taken together, the results reported in Figures 7 and 8 show that the relation-
ship between sociodemographic attributes – particularly income, religious participa-
tion and education – and partisanship is mediated by diverse understandings of the
political debate. First, an interaction between income and religiosity accounts for
individuals’ subscription to different belief systems. Second, education predicts dif-
ferent partisan orientations in the Ideologue and Alternative groups. These findings
are not a mere by-product of our classification of respondents into groups. Indeed,
we obtain the same results conducting an ordinary least squares regression on the
entire sample, in which the dependent variable is a 7-point party identification scale,
and the independent variables include a three-way interaction between religious par-
ticipation, income and education, as well as an economic-moral delta (for additional
control variables used, see SI5). Because, as Figure 7 shows, the likelihood of being
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assigned to the Ideologue group is U-shaped – it increases either with low income and
low religiosity or with high income and high religiosity – we use a quadratic term
for the interaction between these two variables. The predicted effect on party iden-
tification as a function of education is plotted in Figure 9. Each line in this figure
corresponds to a fixed value of the interaction between religious participation and
income, ranging from minimum (light gray) to maximum (black). The slope of this
function changes direction and magnitude as the interaction term changes; it is plot-
ted in inset A. For those on either extreme of this range – namely the high-earning
religious and low-earning non-religious – education increases identification with the
Democratic Party. For those in between, that is, the low-earning religious or the
high-earning non-religious who tend to adopt an alternative belief system, education
increases support for the Republican Party. Inset B plots self-identification with the
Republican Party as a function of the economic-moral delta.7
These results, as we will argue at greater length in the conclusions, complicate
contemporary debates on the effects of class, education and religiosity on party iden-
tification, and suggest that partisanship (and voting behavior) cannot be explained in
terms of whether or not the working class has ‘abandoned’ the Democratic Party or
whether or not ‘values trump economics’. Working-class religious Americans are in-
deed more likely to support the Republican Party, but so are high-earning, educated,
non-religious Americans. Moreover, economic conservatism trumps moral liberalism,
but moral conservatism similarly trumps economic liberalism, both in favor of the
Republican Party. Those who are aligned with the dominant left-right ideological po-
larity, on the other hand, are more likely to be Democrats. Examining each of these
components in isolation, while assuming homogeneity in their aggregate effects, draws
an incomplete, and potentially misleading, picture about how Americans determine
their political allegiances.
Conclusions
“Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study and quantification”
(Converse 1964, 206). The opening line of Philip Converse’s influential study suc-
cinctly captures the gap between theories of public opinion and how they are borne
out in empirical studies. Indeed, the study of belief systems, as well as more recent
7For further details on all models see SI5.
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research on political sophistication and heterogeneity, developed amid discussions con-
cerning analysis and measurement. Our research contributes to the study of public
opinion by overcoming a few important analytical limitations that previous research
suffers from, thus better fulfilling its theoretical objectives.
Though a belief system is characterized by a “functional interdependence” between
attitudes and ideas (Converse 1964, 207), empirical analyses of public opinion are
usually based on models that assume independence among individual attitudes or
summary indices, while the analysis of issue constraint is mostly limited to dyadic
interdependence, measured with correlation coefficients. Using novel network analysis
techniques, we capture the interconnected nature of political beliefs and fully map
their interdependencies. Our analytical strategy inductively identifies collective belief
networks, without making any assumptions about how beliefs relate to one another.
It also allows the detection of multiple and competing belief systems, thus providing
a test for the hypothesis of political heterogeneity. While previous studies of political
cognition assume the existence of a single political belief system or, alternatively,
assume a multiplicity of ways in which people understand politics, we use RCA’s
inductive analysis to find coexisting political belief systems and assign respondents
to these groups without relying on assumptions concerning how issues or individuals
are combined.
The substantive payoff has been the identification of three distinctive ways in
which American citizens interpret the political debate: Ideologues organize their po-
litical attitudes according to the prevalent liberal-conservative polarity; Alternatives
dissociate their preferences on moral issues from their economic and civil rights atti-
tudes; and Agnostics exhibit weak associations among political beliefs. These findings,
which are consistent throughout the twenty-year period under study, cast new light on
previous scholarship: Ideologues and Agnostics conform to Converse’s argument that
individuals’ organization of political beliefs differs according to their level of politi-
cal sophistication. Nonetheless, the identification of the Alternative group challenges
the assumption that there is only one “correct” way of thinking about politics by
demonstrating the existence of competing, and equally coherent, ways of organizing
political beliefs. This finding strongly supports the political heterogeneity approach,
while bringing its social underpinnings to the fore. We demonstrate that the observed
heterogeneity of understandings does not merely derive from differences in individu-
als’ levels of political interest, information, or cognitive capabilities. Rather, people
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with different sociodemographic profiles understand the political debate in system-
atically different ways. Indeed, Alternatives’ deviation from the orthodox political
view “makes sense” in that it effectively accommodates their otherwise irreconcilable
interests and social identities. Given the predominance of moral and economic issues
in political discourse, and their relationships with religious and class identities, it is
difficult for those who are pushed in different ideological directions by their religios-
ity or economic status to find a comfortable position along the liberal-conservative
continuum. Their solution has been to adopt a political worldview that makes room
for their seemingly opposing political interests. From this perspective, Alternatives,
as well as Ideologues, can be understood within a “rational voter” framework (Downs
1957),8 although for them the process of party selection might not be straightforward.
The belief network that characterizes Alternatives derives from the tension these
individuals face in combining their economic and religious social identities. Of course,
there are plenty of other, potentially conflicting identities. Why have some identi-
ties crystallized in a shared system of beliefs, while others have not? We speculate
this has to do with the growing importance of moral issues in the U.S. political dis-
course, and, moreover, the ambiguity of the Republican political offer. In the last
three decades, issues of morality, such as those manifest in controversies over abortion
and gay rights, have come to the fore, at times overshadowing traditional economic
disagreements (Hunter 1991). The process of partisan alignment along moral, civil
rights, and economic issues has made it particularly difficult for people with certain
sociodemographic profiles to define their political allegiance: Will a wealthy, non-
religious individual identify with the Republican Party’s economic views, or with the
Democratic Party’s moral views? Traditional analyses of public opinion offer little
insights into this and related questions. In contrast, we show that when they hold
seemingly competing opinions, Americans are more likely to privilege their conserva-
tive views, and identify with the Republican Party. We believe the political offer plays
an important role in building the cognitive framework within which people operate.
Over the past four decades both neo-liberal and ultra-conservative advocates have
found voice in the Republican Party. To political commentators, neo-liberal support
for economic deregulation and ultra-conservative support for moral restrictions might
appear at odds; nonetheless, these views have found a way to co-exist in the Republi-
8In Downs’ original framework voters and parties are positioned in the same ideological space,
and voters maximize their utility by choosing the party that is closer to their political preferences.
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can Party, thus making the party more appealing to “ideologically heterodox” voters,
and contributing to the crystallization of an alternative belief system.
The existence of multiple belief systems also complicates the relationship between
sociodemographic characteristics and voting behavior. Traditional models of political
behavior assume (often implicitly) the following causal pattern:
Sociodemographic characteristics → Political preferences → Voting behavior
Such models conceive of sociodemographic attributes and their relationships with po-
litical preferences, and consequently partisanship, in “statistical isolation”. Religious
commitments, for example, are assumed to increase conservative preferences on issues
pertaining to morality, and therefore the likelihood of voting Republican, net of other
effects. Our core findings suggest that belief systems mediate the effects of sociode-
mographic attributes on partisanship. If different belief systems embody different
understandings of the relationships between political issues, people who subscribe to
different belief systems might have different motivations for their voting decisions.
Consequently, the same sociodemographic attributes might predict different voting
patterns in different ideational groups. Failing to recognize the heterogeneity of polit-
ical belief systems might lead to biased evaluations of the impact of sociodemographic
factors and political preferences on political behavior. Take, for instance, the debate
triggered by the growing salience of cultural values in US political discourse in recent
decades: scholars and pundits frame the issue in terms of whether moral issues such
as abortion or gay rights trump more traditional economic factors in shaping voters’
partisan orientations; they often rely on class and religiosity to tease out the different
impact of economic and moral issues on political behavior (Brooks and Manza 1997;
Manza and Brooks 1999; Leege et al. 2002; Frank 2004; Bartels 2006; 2008; Gelman,
Shor, Bafumi, Park, and Cortina 2008).9 Yet if the relationship between voting and
sociodemographic attributes is mediated by one’s belief system, then income or re-
ligiosity might have different effects on partisanship for different people. Examining
9For example, in his excellent study, Bartels (2006) thoroughly demonstrates that, contra received
wisdom promoted by pundits and media commentators, white working-class Americans have not
overwhelmingly forsaken economic concerns in favor of moral ones. He shows that economic issues
have had a roughly similar impact on the voting behaviors of low- and high-income individuals,
while cultural issues have become increasingly more relevant for among the wealthiest part of the
population.
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these relationships in the aggregate potentially obscures such differences.
Indeed, our research has shown that the interaction between religiosity and in-
come gives rise to alternative ways of organizing political preferences, that education
affects party identification in opposite directions for members of the Ideologue and
Alternative groups, and that the co-presence of seemingly opposing conservative and
liberal preferences is often resolved in favor of the Republican Party. To our knowl-
edge, these are all novel findings. Nonetheless, one might wonder whether one needs
RCA to draw these conclusions. Technically, as the OLS model summarized in Figure
9 demonstrates, the answer is no. Why, then, has no one reached these conclusions
before? Clearly, without the insights offered by RCA concerning the structure of pref-
erences, the relationship between political attitudes and sociodemographic profiles,
and voters’ biases in favor of conservative views, we would not have come up with
such a complex model specification. Moreover, this regression model, which success-
fully captures the relationship between sociodemographic traits and partisanship, and
between issue preferences and partisanship, cannot provide even a hint about how be-
liefs are organized, and thus cannot help us understand the cognitive heuristics that
people use to make sense of politics in their own lives.
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Figure 1: Hypothetical Belief Space. Respondents plotted in red and marked with
a plus sign (i.e., subject D) organize their preferences according to the liberal-
conservative divide on all three issues, while respondents plotted in blue and marked
by a dot (i.e., A, B, and C) structure their preferences on an opposition between gay
rights and the other two issues. The inset plots the relationship between political
preferences for subjects A, B, C, and D.
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Figure 3: Time Consistency: Correlation Matrices by Group over Time. Each cell
represents the average correlation between all pairs of variables in the two issue do-
mains the cell corresponds to. Each matrix corresponds to a particular survey year
in one of the three RCA groups. Cell shades correspond to correlation strengths, and
the plus and minus signs to the correlation direction.
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Figure 4: Group Membership by Various Measures of Political Sophistication. Plots
report group average levels of education, political interest, political activism, and
political discussion. A circle indicates that the mean is significantly different from
the means in the other two groups.
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Figure 5: Trends in Pair Correlations between Issue Domains by Group. Each figure
plots the average correlation between all pairs of issues in two given issue domains
over the twenty-year period. The uppermost figure, for example, plots the average
correlations between economic and civil rights issues. A circle indicates that the
average correlation is statistically different from zero at the α=0.05 level.
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Figure 6: Belief Spaces. Each of the seven diagrams in this figure represents the
location of one sociodemographic attribute in a two-dimensional belief space (the
economic dimension on the X axis, the moral dimension on the Y axis). For each
RCA group we draw a line in this two-dimensional space. The coordinates that
define the two extremes of the line correspond to the mean correlation between the
sociodemographic attribute in question and the variables that make up either the
economic or moral opinion categories, averaged over the twenty-year period. The
plus and minus signs represent high and low sociodemographic values respectively.
The lines connecting these coordinates outline the direction and magnitude of the
relationship between the sociodemographic variable and opinions on economic and
moral issues.
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Figure 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression for RCA Group Membership: Plot of the
interaction between Income and Religious Attendance. This diagram plots the odds
ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the
Alternative group, as a function of an interaction between income and religious par-
ticipation, as modeled by a multinomial logistic regression. The data are pooled
across the twenty year period. The model is described by the following formula:
log( P (RCA)=I
P (RCA)=A
) = α0+α1∗income+α2∗religious+α3∗(income∗religious)+βTX+
where X represents control variables (sociodemographic and year dummies, see Sup-
porting Materials), and α and β are regression coefficients. Each of the five lines
plotted in the diagram corresponds to one of the five religious participation cate-
gories. The income variable is categorized by percentile to make it comparable across
years.
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Figure 8: Party Identification by RCA group. These diagrams plot OLS predictions
of party self-identification on a 7-point scale, ranging from strong Democrat to strong
Republican, as a function of (A) the difference between one’s degree of conservatism
on economic and moral issues, (B) education, (C) income, and (D) religious partici-
pation. The economic-moral delta ∆EMi = Ei−M i which is plotted on the X-axis of
panel A, corresponds to the difference between respondent i’s mean level of economic
conservatism, Ei, and mean level of moral conservatism, M i, both scaled over a zero-
to-one range. A ∆EM value close to 1 corresponds to high economic conservatism and
high moral liberalism, whereas a value close to -1 corresponds to the opposite. The
data are pooled across the twenty-year period, and fitted using the following model:
y = α0 + α1 ∗ ∆EM + α2 ∗ ∆EM2 + βT1 ∗ R ∗ X + βT2 Z + 
where X represents sociodemopgraphic variables and Z year dummies (see SI), and
α and β are regression coefficients. R represents interaction terms that allow effects
to vary by RCA group. The lines plotted correspond to the modeled probability
of self-identifying as a Republican for the respondent with average control values in
each of the two groups. While in the Ideologue group the economic-moral delta has
an insignificant (p(α1)=0.754, p(α2)=0.395) effect on party self-identification, in the
Alternative group identification as Republican significantly increases (p(α1)=0.016,
p(α2)=0.038) as the respondent expresses opposing opinions on economic and moral
issues. In other words, controlling for their sociodemographic attributes, Alternative
respondents who are either strongly economically conservative but morally moderate
or liberal, as well as those who are strongly morally conservative but economically
moderate or liberal, are significantly more likely to identify as Republicans, compared
to those whose moral and economic opinions are aligned.
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Figure 9: Party Identification. OLS prediction of party identification as a function of a
three-way interaction between income, religious participation and education. Data are
pooled across the twenty-year period. Each line plots the expected party identification
as a function of education, constrained to a fixed level of an interaction term between
religious attendance and income. These levels range from low, when income and
religious attendance are minimal (light gray), to high, when both religious attendance
and income are maximal (black). For example, when both religious attendance and
income are minimal, identification as Republican decreases by roughly one point as
education increases from minimum to maximum. Inset A plots the slope of the line
as a function of change in the interaction term. The dashed blue line corresponds to
the median respondent. Inset B plots the predicted degree of party identification as
a function of the economic-moral delta, ∆EM .
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Supporting Information
SI1. Data
The analysis is based on the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumula-
tive dataset that includes variables from each of the biennial cross-sectional studies
conducted between 1948 and 2008. We used a subset of this dataset that includes
variables from each of the studies conducted between 1984 and 2004. Public opinion
variables that were asked in fewer than three different studies since 1984 were removed
from the dataset. Our dataset focuses exclusively on variables that fall under one of
our four issue categories: economic, civil rights, morality and foreign policy. Studies
conducted before 1984 included too few variables pertaining to moral issues, and were
therefore not included. Wording and variable scaling were changed significantly in
2008: as a result, this year was not included in our analysis.
To facilitate a relational class analysis (RCA), all respondents must provide an-
swers for all questions. We therefore list-wise deleted respondents who had missing
answers. For years 1990, 1998 and 2002, the list-wise deletion of respondents either
removed the entire sample for that year, or retained only a very small number of vari-
ables for that year. Consequently, these study years were excluded from the analysis.
Since binary variables have no mid-range values and are therefore inappropriate for
use in RCA, they were also removed from the dataset. Two additional variables that
had high levels of missing data (VCF9043 and VCF0818) were also removed.
This procedure left the 43 variables listed in Table S1, which were used for the
relational analysis. Table S2 indicates which variables were available for each year,
as well as the number of respondents used in the analysis, by year. The number of
variables used in each year ranges from 24 to 40. The median study year included
32 variables. On average, each variable was available in six of the eight years ana-
lyzed. Sociodemographic and political sophistication variables, used for multivariate
analyses reported in sections 3.2 and 3.3, are reported in Table S3.
SI2. Relational Class Analysis
The RCA analysis was conducted for each year independently; each year used a dif-
ferent subset of variables, as summarized in Table S2. For a detailed description of
RCA, its theoretical and methodological assumptions and motivation, and its appli-
cation, see Goldberg (2010). We provide a short summary of RCA in order to explain
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how we applied it to the ANES data. The RCA procedure is based on the following
three-stage sequence:
1. Relationality is calculated for all pairs of respondents, using the formula de-
scribed in section 2. This results in a proximity matrix with cell values ranging
from -1 to +1.
2. The statistical significance of each cell value is determined using a bootstrapping
procedure that relies on 10,000 re-samples. Cell values are normalized by the
sample mean and standard deviation. Insignificant cell values (for α = 0.05)
are set to zero, resulting in a sparse network.
3. A spectral algorithm using eigenvalues is used to partition the network into
discrete groups. The spectral algorithm maximizes modularity, which is the
difference between observed and random within-group edge weights (assuming
the distribution of node degrees remains fixed). See Newman and Girvan (2004)
for a discussion on modularity, and Newman (2006) for a detailed description
of the spectral algorithm.
Applying RCA to each year’s subset of observations independently results in a par-
tition of each subset into discrete groups of respondents. The partitioning algorithm
used by RCA is based on an iterative procedure that continues until modularity can-
not be maximized: each group is recursively partitioned in two until such a partition
no longer increases modularity (Newman 2006). However, not every maximization
step produces a meaningful partition. When the increase in modularity is negligi-
ble, the partition creates two marginally different groups. Consequently, we ran the
partitioning algorithm so that is stopped if the additional contribution to modularity
was smaller than 1%. This resulted in a partition of seven of the eight yearly subsets
into three groups. One subset, for the year 1996, was partitioned into four groups.
In order to maintain consistency across all years, we decided to enforce a three-group
partition in this subset by reversing the final step of the algorithm. This step only
contributed 6.53% to modularity, and therefore had an insignificant impact on the
results.
We then examined the correlation structure between opinion variables in each
group produced by RCA in order to decide which of the three groups in each year
would be labeled as Ideologue, Alternative and Agnostic. This turned out to be a
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trivial task, as each group is clearly characterized by an unambiguous pattern of
relationships between variables that corresponding to one of these three groups.
SI3. Factor Analysis
The yearly correlations between issue domains reported in Figures 3 and 5 demon-
strate that for members of the Alternative group, opinions on moral issues are gener-
ally disassociated with opinions on economic issues and civil rights. The exceptions
are the years 1992 to 1996, in which the average correlations between opinions on
morality, on the one hand, and economic and/or civil rights issues on the other,
are significantly positive. The correlations are nevertheless significantly weaker than
those in the Ideologue group, as Figure S1 illustrates.
In order to further investigate the relationships between the four issue domains
in the three groups we conducted factor analyses for each year and group indepen-
dently. The results of these analyses are reported in Figure S2. Each panel reports
the results of a factor analysis applied to the responses of members of one of the
three groups in a given study year. Each circle represents one issue domain. The
coordinates of each circle correspond to the average factor loading for the first two
factors for variables comprising that issue domain. The results clearly demonstrate
that in the Alternative group’s opinions on morality and economics are consistently
farthest apart, specifically in years 1992 to 1996, whereas in the Ideologue group they
are closer together. In most years, for at least one of the two factors the average
loading for moral opinions has a different sign than that for economic opinions.
SI4. Correlation Analyses
Figures 3 and 5 report correlations between issue domains for each year. Each cell
reports the average weighted correlation between all pairs of issues in the given two
domains. Formally:
ρ(A,B) =
1
|A||B|
∑
∀a∈A,b∈B
ρ˜(a, b) (5)
where A and B are sets of variables, each for a different issue domain, and ρ˜ is
the weighted Pearson correlation coefficient for two variables. We use centrality as
our weighting coefficient. Centrality corresponds to the eigenvectors produced by
the network partitioning algorithm used by RCA. Intuitively, the centrality of each
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observation measures the extent to which this observation is central to the group it
was assigned to. We get very similar results if no weighting is used. We determine
the significance of ρ using a simple t-test.
SI5. General Linear Models
Section 3.3 reports three different models, which include a combination of public
opinion and sociodemographic/sophistication variables. In this section we provide
a detailed description of each of the models. List-wise deletion was used to treat
missing data in all models.
Figure 7 reports the results of a multinomial logit model, in which the dependent
variable is a nominal variable that corresponds to RCA group assignment. Data are
pooled across all years. Figure 7 reports the odds ratio of being assigned to the
Ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the Alternative group. The odds
ratio is plotted as a function of an interaction between religious participation and
income. Sociodemographic control variables used are age, gender, race, southern and
professional status (see Table S3). Because we want to examine the extent to which
sociodemographic variables predict group membership above and beyond political
sophistication, we include political interest and political activism as control variables
(political discussion was not asked in 1988 and was therefore omitted). Dummy
variables are included to account for year effects. Results are reported in Table S4.
Figure 8 reports results of an OLS model in whichc the dependent variable is
a 7-point party identification scale. Data are pooled over all years. To account for
different effects in each RCA group, all of the independent variables (excluding year
dummies) were interacted with a group membership dummy for each of the three RCA
groups. Independent variables include all sociodemographic variables. Also included
is a ∆EM variable, which measures the difference between the average position on
economic and moral issues (see Figure 8 caption for a formal definition). Quadratic
terms are used for ∆EM and education. Results are reported in Table S5.
Figure 9 reports results of an OLS model in whichc the dependent variable is
a 7-point party identification scale. Data are pooled over all years. Independent
variables include a three-way interaction between income, religious participation and
education. The interaction between income and religious participation is modeled
with a quadratic term. Results are reported in Table S6.
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     Label                                       Wording Range               Scaling
health.ins Support for government or private health insurance 7 1 - government, 7 - private
jobs.guar7 Support for government guarantee jobs and income 7 1 - guarantee, 7 - not guar.
gov.services Should government reduce or increase spending 7 1 - increase, 7 - reduce
FS.poor Should federal spending on the poor 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.childcare Should federal spending on childcare 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.crime Should federal spending on crime 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.aids Should federal spending on AIDS 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.publicschools Should federal spending on public schools 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.aidcollege Should federal spending on college aid 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.homeless Should federal spending on homeless 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.welfare Should federal spending on welfare 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.food.stamps Should federal spending on food stamps 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.envir Should federal spending on the environment 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.soc.sec Should federal spending on social security 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.assist.blacks Should federal spending on assistance to blacks 3 1 - increase, 3 - decrease
urb.unrest Best way of dealing with urban rioting 7 1 - solve poverty, 7 - force
negro.chan How much has the position of negors improved 3 1 - not much, 3 - a lot
civil.rights.too.fastCivil rights have pushed too fast 3 1 - too slow, 3 - too fast
sch.busing Support for school busing for integration 7 1 - support, 7 - oppose
blacks.aid Should the government help blacks 7 1 - help, 7 - not help
aff.action Opinion on affirmative action 4 1 - support, 4 - oppose
eq.opp Society should ensure equal opportunity 5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
too.much.eq.rightsWe have gone too far in pushing equal rights in country 5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
eq.chances One of the big problems in this country is that we don't 
giveeveryone an equal chance.
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
more.eq. 
chances
It is not really that big a problem if some people have 
more of a chance in life than others.
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
less.eq This country would be better off if we worried less about 
how equal people are
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
eq.treat If people were treated more equally in this country we 
would havemany fewer problems
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
hard.blacks Generations of slavery and discrimination have created 
conditionsthat make it difficult for blacks to work their 
way out of the lowerclass
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
no.favor.blacks Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities 
overcame prejudice and worked their way up.  Blacks 
should to the same without any special favors
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
blacks.try.harder It's really a matter of some people not trying hard 
enough; if blackswould only try harder they could be just 
as well off as whites
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
blacks.deserve.
more
Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve.
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
women.role Should women have an equal role with men in running 
business, industry and government
7 1 - equal, 7 - women in the 
home
new.lifestyles The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of 
our society
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
moral.behavior The world is always changing and we should adjust our 
view of moral behavior to those changes
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
trad.values This country would have many fewer problems if there 
were more emphasis on traditional family ties
5 1 - disagree, 5 - agree
different.values We should be more tolerant of people who choose to 
live according to their own moral standards, even if they 
are very different from our own
5 1 - agree, 5 - disagree
homosex Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals 
against job discrimination
5 1 - favor, 5 - oppose
gay.military Should gays be allowed to serve in the military 5 1 - allowed, 5 - disallowed
abort When should abortion be permitted 4 1 - always, 4 - never
urss.coop Should we try hard to get along with Russia 7 1 - try hard, 7 - get tougher
defense.spend Should we spend more or less on defense? 7 1 - less, 7 - more
FS.foreignaid Federal spending on foreign aid 3 ?
FS.space Federal spending on space/science/technology 3 ?
Econom
ics
Civil 
Rights
Morality
Foreign 
Policy
Table S1: List of Variables
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Label Wording Tot 1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1996 2000 2004
health.ins Health Insurance 7 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
jobs.guar7 Government Guarantee Jobs 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
gov.services Government Spending 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FS.poor Spending on Poor 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
FS.childcare Fed Spending on Childcare 6 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
FS.crime Fed Spending on Crime 6 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
FS.aids Fed Spending on AIDS 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
FS.publicschools Fed Spending on Public Schools 7 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
FS.aidcollege Fed Spending on College Aid 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
FS.homeless Fed Spending on Homeless 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
FS.welfare Fed Spending on Welfare 5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
FS.food.stamps Fed Spending on Food Stamps 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
FS.envir Fed Spending on Environment 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
FS.soc.sec Fed Spending on Social Security 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FS.assist.blacks Fed Spending on Assist. Blacks 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
urb.unrest Urban Unrest 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
negro.chan Negro Position Changed 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
civil.rights.too.fast Civil Rights Push Too Fast 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
sch.busing School Busing 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
blacks.aid Aid to Blacks 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
aff.action Affirmative Action 6 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
eq.opp Ensure Equal Opportunity 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
too.much.eq.rights Too Far Pushing Equal Rights 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
eq.chances Problem if Chances not Equal 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
more.eq.chances Some Have More Equal Chances 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
less.eq Should Worry Less about Equality 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
eq.treat More Equal Treatment 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
hard.blacks Conditions Difficult for Blacks 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
no.favor.blacks Blacks Shouldn’t be favored 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
blacks.try.harder Blacks Must Try Harder 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
blacks.deserve.moreBlacks Deserve More 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
women.role Women Equal Roles 7 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
new.lifestyles New Lifestyles Break Down Society 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
moral.behavior Moral Behvaior 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
trad.values Emphasis Traditional Values 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
different.values Tolerant Different Values 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
homosex Law Protect Homosexuals 5 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
gay.military Gays in the Military 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
abort Abortion 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
urss.coop Cooperate w USSR 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
defense.spend Defense Spending 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FS.foreignaid Fed Spending on Foreign Aid 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
FS.space Fed Spending on Space 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Year 1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1996 2000 2004 total
Number of issues 24 29 35 40 31 32 35 32 258
Number of respondents 456 625 766 954 1136 871 443 609 5860
Economics
Civil Rights
Morality
Foreign 
Policy
Table S2: Variables by Year
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Variable Measurment Year Mean
Standard 
Deviation Variable Measurment Year Mean
Standard 
Deviation
1984 41.47 15.22 1984 3.01 1.41
1986 41.22 15.62 1986 3.12 1.46
1988 43.58 16.22 1988 3.19 1.42
1992 43.76 16.18 1992 2.77 1.64
1994 44.60 16.23 1994 2.83 1.63
1996 47.14 16.28 1996 2.86 1.59
2000 46.84 16.42 2000 2.81 1.56
2004 47.02 16.46 2004 2.76 1.58
1984 1.48 0.50 1984 4.04 2.10
1986 1.52 0.50 1986 3.61 2.08
1988 1.50 0.50 1988 4.13 2.11
1992 1.48 0.50 1992 3.77 2.06
1994 1.49 0.50 1994 4.10 2.12
1996 1.52 0.50 1996 3.84 2.18
2000 1.47 0.50 2000 3.78 2.08
2004 1.49 0.50 2004 4.04 2.12
1984 0.09 0.29 1984 2.19 0.69
1986 0.14 0.34 1986 1.98 0.72
1988 0.10 0.30 1988 2.18 0.71
1992 0.11 0.32 1992 2.36 0.67
1994 0.10 0.30 1994 2.11 0.70
1996 0.08 0.27 1996 2.14 0.68
2000 0.10 0.30 2000 2.14 0.71
2004 0.15 0.36 2004 2.35 0.67
1984 3.21 1.02 1984 1.71 1.06
1986 3.04 1.05 1986 1.63 1.03
1988 3.09 1.04 1988 1.70 0.99
1992 3.10 1.10 1992 1.84 1.04
1994 3.01 1.07 1994 1.55 0.93
1996 3.07 1.08 1996 1.66 0.98
2000 2.97 1.11 2000 1.64 0.93
2004 3.07 1.18 2004 2.07 1.12
1984 0.32 0.47 1984 1.78 0.41
1986 0.31 0.46 1986 1.79 0.41
1988 0.35 0.48 1988 NA NA
1992 0.32 0.47 1992 1.90 0.30
1994 0.34 0.47 1994 1.83 0.37
1996 0.41 0.49 1996 1.85 0.36
2000 0.41 0.49 2000 1.84 0.37
2004 0.39 0.49 2004 1.84 0.37
1984 0.29 0.46
1986 0.33 0.47
1988 0.32 0.47
1992 0.29 0.45
1994 0.34 0.47
1996 0.34 0.48
2000 0.32 0.47
2004 0.31 0.46
Income
Family income, 
standardized by 
year over 5 
categories that 
correspond to 0-17, 
17-33, 33-67, 67-83 
and 83-100 
percetinles.
Political 
Discussion
Binary, does 
respondent discuss 
politics with family 
and friends
Party ID
Party identification, 
ranging from (1) 
strong Democrat, 
through (4) 
Independent, to (7) 
strong Republican
Political Interest
Respondent's 
interest in elections, 
scaled (1) not much, 
(2) somewhat, (3) 
very much 
Political Activism
Campaign 
Participation Count, 
scaled from 1 to 6
Professional
Binary, respondent's 
occupational group 
is professional or 
managerial 
Southern
Binary, respondent's 
state is one of the 
Census Bureau's 
southern states
Church
How often attends 
religious services, 
scaled: (1) Never, 
(2) Few times a year 
(3) Once a month, 
(4) Almost every 
week, (5) every 
week
Age Measured in years
Gender Binary, respondent is female
Black Binary, respondent's race is black
Table S3: Distribution of Sociodemographic Characteristics by Year
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Figure S1: Average weighted correlations for Economic/Civil Rights vs. Moral Issues
by type.
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Figure S2: Two factors plots by type and year. Each panel reports the results of a
single factor analysis applied to the responses of members of one of the three groups in
a given study year. Each circle represents one issue domain. The location of a circle
corresponds to the average factor loading for variables comprising the issue domain
for the first two factors.
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Log(P(Ideologue)/P(Alternative)) Coef. Std. Err. z P
church x income -0.055 * 0.022 -2.54 0.011
income 0.087 0.072 1.21 0.225
church 0.193 ** 0.072 2.68 0.007
age 0.002 0.002 0.97 0.334
gender -0.396 *** 0.073 -5.43 0.000
black -0.575 *** 0.117 -4.93 0.000
south 0.124 0.080 1.55 0.120
education -0.131 *** 0.028 -4.6 0.000
professional -0.085 0.086 -0.99 0.323
political interest -0.211 *** 0.057 -3.68 0.000
political activism -0.069 0.036 -1.9 0.058
year 1984 -1.169 *** 0.194 -6.02 0.000
year 1986 -0.314 * 0.158 -1.99 0.046
year 1988 -0.141 0.151 -0.93 0.353
year 1992 -0.132 0.138 -0.96 0.338
year 1994 0.443 ** 0.139 3.19 0.001
year 1996 -0.736 *** 0.143 -5.13 0.000
year 2000 0.484 ** 0.173 2.79 0.005
intercept 1.762 *** 0.329 5.35 0.000
N = 4548
Table S4: Results of the Multinomial Logit model presented in Figure 7.
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Party ID Coef. Std. Err. t P
Ideologues
! EM -0.102 0.315 -0.33 0.745
( ! EM ) 2 -0.619 0.804 -0.77 0.441
education 0.543 ** 0.194 2.8 0.005
education 2 -0.070 ** 0.021 -3.29 0.001
income 0.250 *** 0.054 4.66 0.000
church 0.239 *** 0.035 6.85 0.000
age -0.001 0.004 -0.28 0.780
gender -0.462 *** 0.103 -4.51 0.000
black -1.942 *** 0.161 -12.09 0.000
south 0.066 0.113 0.58 0.560
professional -0.273 * 0.123 -2.22 0.026
Alternatives
! EM 0.514 * 0.214 2.4 0.016
( ! EM ) 2 1.135 * 0.536 2.12 0.034
education 0.377 * 0.163 2.32 0.020
education 2 -0.029 0.019 -1.54 0.123
income 0.200 *** 0.048 4.18 0.000
church 0.158 *** 0.032 5 0.000
age -0.001 0.003 -0.39 0.696
gender -0.238 * 0.093 -2.56 0.011
black -1.690 *** 0.163 -10.39 0.000
south -0.084 0.102 -0.82 0.412
professional -0.148 0.114 -1.31 0.191
Agnostics
! EM 0.504 0.296 1.7 0.089
( ! EM ) 2 1.258 0.755 1.67 0.096
education -0.134 0.215 -0.62 0.533
education 2 0.019 0.025 0.77 0.443
income 0.250 *** 0.061 4.11 0.000
church 0.111 ** 0.041 2.71 0.007
age -0.012 ** 0.004 -3.13 0.002
gender 0.021 0.118 0.18 0.859
black -1.477 *** 0.254 -5.81 0.000
south -0.007 0.126 -0.06 0.956
professional 0.152 0.150 1.01 0.312
Control Dummies
year 1984 -0.177 0.150 -1.17 0.240
year 1986 -0.410 ** 0.131 -3.13 0.002
year 1988 0.156 0.126 1.24 0.215
year 1992 -0.328 ** 0.117 -2.81 0.005
year 1994 -0.024 0.114 -0.21 0.833
year 1996 -0.246 * 0.120 -2.05 0.040
year 2000 -0.496 ** 0.143 -3.48 0.001
Alternative 0.257 0.681 0.38 0.706
Agnostic 1.150 0.762 1.51 0.132
intercept 2.620 *** 0.540 4.85 0.000
N = 4540
Table S5: Results of the OLS Model presented in Figure 8.
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Party ID Coef. Std. Err. t P
! EM 0.682 *** 0.157 4.35 0.000
( ! EM ) 2 1.418 *** 0.385 3.68 0.000
income 0.186 * 0.076 2.45 0.014
education -0.215 *** 0.056 -3.82 0.000
church 0.134 0.078 1.7 0.089
church x income -0.191 * 0.078 -2.44 0.015
church x income x education 0.047 *** 0.012 3.81 0.000
(church x income) 2 0.007 * 0.003 2.35 0.019
education x (church x income) 2 -0.002 ** 0.001 -2.84 0.004
age -0.005 ** 0.002 -2.81 0.005
gender -0.257 *** 0.060 -4.31 0.000
black -1.844 *** 0.103 -17.93 0.000
south -0.022 0.065 -0.34 0.734
professional -0.185 * 0.072 -2.55 0.011
year 1984 -0.310 * 0.148 -2.1 0.036
year 1986 -0.426 ** 0.131 -3.25 0.001
year 1988 0.154 0.127 1.22 0.223
year 1992 -0.325 ** 0.117 -2.78 0.005
year 1994 0.046 0.114 0.4 0.687
year 1996 -0.242 * 0.119 -2.03 0.042
year 2000 -0.401 ** 0.143 -2.8 0.005
intercept 4.758 *** 0.315 15.12 0.000
N = 4540
Table S6: Results of the OLS Model presented in Figure 9.
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